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Abstract In the first part of this paper, we share and
elucidate the way we mobilize histories in some disciplines
that are part of the undergraduate courses in mathematics
teacher education offered by State University of Campinas
and Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte in Brazil.
This way of mobilization can be featured as a set of col-
lective indisciplinary problematizations occurring in a
series of student investigations. Mobilizing practices of
mathematics culture are the object of these investigations.
These practices are performed by different communities
both constituted by and constituent of different human
activities. In the second part of this paper, we will discuss
our way of mobilizing histories, contrasting it with the
theoretical perspective of expansive learning, just as it has
been defended by Yrjo¨ Engestro¨m, in his article Non scolae
sed vitae discimus—towards overcoming the encapsulation
of school learning. We will also attempt to highlight the
role which this researcher has attributed to history in his
model of expansive learning, a perspective based on the
current research on activity theory.
Keywords Mathematics teacher education  Histories 
Social practices  Discursive memory games 
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1 Introduction
Our point of view concerning the mobilization of histories
in mathematics teacher education is based on the inde-
pendent works we have been developing through the years
in some disciplines that are part of the undergraduate
courses in mathematics teacher education offered by State
University of Campinas and Federal University of Rio
Grande do Norte.1
Due to the similarity of these works—sometimes shared
with colleagues from our other institutions,2 but always
refined consistent with our professional practices—we
think they can all be theoretically related.
In that sense, this article has a dual purpose. First, we
want to relate and discuss the way we mobilize histories in
mathematics teacher education. Our report does not rely
upon research that would ‘‘test’’ the absolute or relative
‘‘efficiency’’ of a particular way of mobilizing histories in
teacher education. However, due to the depth of our edu-
cational experience—repeatedly lived, reflected, and
transformed, based on varying degrees of student
involvement—we shall not give an account of it here in the
usual sense.
Actually, the reference to our experience only estab-
lishes an explanatory strategy to show and discuss our
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1 Here, we are referring to the disciplines: School Mathematics
Education I and II, which are part of the undergraduate courses of
mathematics teacher education at the State University of Campinas,
as well as the disciplines: Topics of History of Mathematics and
Epistemological Foundations of Mathematics in courses at the
Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte.
2 For one of us, the discussion and refinement of this experience,
which is briefly reported in the reference (Miguel and Miorim 2005),
was carried out in a composite way until 2005 with Maria Aˆngela
Miorim, teacher of the Faculdade de Educac¸a˜o of UNICAMP.
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point of view, theoretically, regarding the way we have
been mobilizing histories in mathematics teacher educa-
tion. For this reason, we will try to highlight the theoreti-
cal–philosophical dialogue we have established in recent
years, with valuable literature drawn from the various fields
of knowledge such as history, sociology, linguistics, and
anthropology, among others.
Second, we will deepen the theoretical–philosophical
assessment of our experience, contrasting it by means of a
game of approaches and differentiations with the theoreti-
cal perspective of expansive learning, just as it has been
defended by Yrjo¨ Engestro¨m (1991). Moreover, we will
also attempt to highlight the role which this researcher has
attributed to history in his model of expansive learning, a
perspective the current research on activity theory.
2 Mobilizing histories in mathematics teacher
education
In our work with mathematics teacher education, histories
have been marshaled in four stages: (1) the participants’
individual memories of the ways in which the mathemati-
cal culture3 has been mobilized in their school lives; (2) the
posing of guiding questions in the investigation of mathe-
matical culture in the context of school practices; (3)
investigation of official teaching guidelines and textbooks
designed for teaching in Brazilian schools; (4) the inter-
viewing of mathematics teachers and students from Ele-
mentary and High Schools.
These histories, taken together, are seen as flashes of
discursive memory games which mobilize social practices
of mathematics culture, performed by different communi-
ties4 which constitute (and are constituent of) different
human activities.
Such discursive games of alternative memories are
produced by the participants based on investigative works,
and as they constitute and assess such games comparatively
and collectively, they also continue developing their
identities as peripheral members of the community of
mathematics teachers. Each game becomes an object of
indisciplinary problematization along with the participants
who, as they get involved with and develop these games,
adhering to their objectives and rules, they themselves
constitute a community of cultural problematization.
Since the notions of social practices, discursive games
and indisciplinary problematization each play a crucial role
in the mobilization of histories in teacher education, we
shall subdivide this section into three parts. In the first, we
shall clarify the meanings with which we are mobilizing
the social practical expressions and discursive games.
In the second, we shall outline the meaning we have
given here to the notion of indisciplinary problematization,
as well as the role it plays in teacher education.
Likewise, in the third part of this section, we shall
characterize the ways we mobilize histories in teacher
education, in each of the four stages previously mentioned.
2.1 Histories, social practices and discursive games
Several thinkers have used the expression social practice,
highlighting, among them: Foucault, Bourdieu, Habermas,
Lyotard, and Certeau.
According to Schatzki (1996, pp. 89–90),
at least three notions of practice are prominent in the
current conjuncture. According to one, practicing is
learning how or improving one’s ability to do
something by repeatedly working at and carrying it
out. It is in this sense of practice that adults practice
the piano (…) In a second sense, practice is a tem-
porally unfolding and spatially dispersed nexus of
doings and sayings. Examples are cooking practices,
voting practices (…). To say that the doings and the
sayings forming a practice constitute a nexus is to say
that they are linked in certain ways. Three major
avenues of linkage are involved: (1) through under-
standings, for example, of what to say and do; (2)
through explicit rules, principles, precepts, and
instructions; and (3) through what I will call ‘‘teleo-
affective’’ structures embracing ends, projects, tasks,
purposes, beliefs, emotions, and moods. (…) A third
prominent notion of practice is that of performing an
action or carrying out a practice of the second sort.
It is important to emphasize that we are not using the
word practice as opposed to theory and, in that sense,
neither use of practice means a thoughtless action, nor does
theory mean an action-less thought (Wenger 1998). Also,
the word practice is not being used here to refer to a place
where we do something, a place where—as it is often
said—‘‘we get our hands dirty’’.
When we talk about social practices we talk about
articulated and previously interpreted groups of actions.
Not about any action or group of actions, but actions
which, even when carried out by one single person, must be
connected to different types of human activity placed in
3 Based on Thompson (1990), we mean by culture every intentional
act of symbolic mobilization of objects of any nature, by institutional
subjects, i.e., by subjects that always act and interact under the
conditioning of instituted norms. We observe, then, that this symbolic
and dynamic conception of culture does not see it as a repository of
whatever it means, but as a set of semiotic practices performed by all
situated subjects, i.e., by institutional subjects.
4 In the second section of this paper, we will refer to such
communities as ethno-communities.
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time and space in order to be defined and interpreted. We
can, in that way, talk about reading practices, written steps
of calculations, practices of garbage gathering, etc. So, the
practices thus conceived as a group of actions are not
synonymous with activity, although they can be carried out
in different contexts of human activity.
More precisely, the term social practice here means an
intentional and coordinated group of actions that simulta-
neously mobilizes cultural objects, memory, affections,
values and powers, generating in the people who carry out
such actions the feeling, albeit diffuse, of belonging to a
determined community. These actions are not chaotic or
random precisely because we recognize in them cultural
objects that have a history. This history is remembered
only because the cultural objects which this practice
mobilizes are still valued by at least one community which
keeps this memory alive for a reason. In that sense, a social
practice is cultural because it always mobilizes cultural
objects. On the other hand, a social practice is social
because, even when it is carried out by a single person, it is
always linked to human activities previously developed by
socially organized communities. Therefore, from now on,
we will simply speak of practices alone without adjectives.
Besides, the way that we interpret and carry out prac-
tices in different contexts varies from person to person, not
just in their purposes, values, reasons, desires and inter-
pretive resources, but also in the conditioning these con-
texts impose upon the realization of these practices. This is
why we say that a practice also mobilizes affections.
Furthermore, every time it is put into circulation, a
practice establishes a game, which is not always explicit, of
asymmetrical power relationships among the participants
of the community, as well as in a heterogeneous and dif-
ferential game of valuation or of resistances between the
participants of this community concerning this practice.
And not only knowledge produces power, but also power
produces knowledge, as Foucault warned us, getting to the
point of stating that a society without power relationships
can only be an abstraction.
On the other hand, the expression discursive games is
being used here as an analogue in meaning to the notion of
Wittgenstein’s language games (Wittgenstein 2006).
We think that the relation we establish between the
theoretical constructs activity and practice could also be
described in Wittgensteinian terms. Since an activity, when
viewed as an autonomous and self-signifying form of life
(Wittgenstein 2006), is always developed by a community
which at the same time performs practices connected to this
activity, it also produces language games which are only
distinguishable from their own correlative practices by the
type of symbolic forms it mobilizes.
At the same time, practices and language games can be
seen as indistinguishable from a semiotic point of view,
given the fact that both can be conceived as cultural objects
or symbolic forms, in Thompson’s sense (Thompson 1990).
And so, the meanings of a practice would be inconceivable
outside of the language games constituted in an activity
(Miguel and Vilela 2008).
However, a practice is not always an activity, once a
‘‘same’’ practice can be performed in different activities,
taking on diverse significance in the function of the dif-
ferent purposes which orient its performance in different
activities. We might, for instance, carry out the practice
of clapping hands at a birthday party, to salute the
birthday celebrant, or at the door of a house without a
doorbell to call for its inhabitants, or inside a classroom
to call the students’ attention, or even applauding an
artist at a concert, as well as in many other situations.
And in each one of them, the practice of ‘‘clapping
hands’’ has a different meaning. In an analogue way, a
practice of spatial orientation can be performed, with
different meanings, in nautical, agricultural, topographical
and astronomical activities, among others, mobilizing
different purposes, instruments, methods, etc.
2.2 The practice of INdisciplinary problematization
The way we have mobilized histories in teacher education
has been guided by a procedure of collective INdisciplinary
problematization of successive assessments carried out by
the students.
The term INdisciplinary is used by the Brazilian linguist
Moita Lopes (2006), with a meaning similar to that given
by the current transgressive theories to the notion of
transgression (Pennycook 2006; Hooks 1994). For him,
indiscipline does not only mean an act of transcendence,
but above all, an act of transgressing disciplinary
boundaries.
More than a mere epistemological crossing of disci-
plinary lines, the difference he seems to establish between
the transdisciplinarity and transgressivity characterizes
itself, above all, by a qualitative rupture with the disci-
plinary ‘‘way of seeing’’, i.e., with the objectivist paradigm
that has persistently oriented the ways of producing the so-
called ‘‘scientific’’ knowledge, according to a concept of
rationality seen as ‘‘bodyless, lacking an understanding of
the heterogeneity, fragmentation and mutability of the
social subject, understood as placed in a sociohistorical
void, and without contemplating ethical and power issues’’
(Moita Lopes 2006, p. 27).
This way of practicing the indiscipline shows family
resemblances with the notion of transgression in the way it
has been mobilized by Pennycook:
‘‘(…) in the domain of transgressive theories, I’m
interested in relating the concepts of translocation, as a
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way of thinking the interrelation of the local inside the
global; transculturalization, as a way of thinking cul-
ture and the processes of cultural interaction that allow
fluidity in relationships; transmodality as a way of
thinking the use of language as it is placed within the
multiple ways of semiotic diffusion; transtextualiza-
tion, as a way of thinking signs pervading contexts;
translation, as a way of thinking the meaning as an act
of interpretation that crosses the boundaries of com-
prehension modes; transformation as a way of thinking
the constant change towards all the ways of meaning
and interpretation’’ (Pennycook 2006, pp. 76–77).
Our way of practicing indiscipline as transgression is
also consonant with the transgressive appeal suggested in
Foucault’s piece, in the sense of stimulating the destabi-
lizing practice, decolonization or deconstruction of deter-
mined ways of thinking, not only with the purpose of
giving visibility to other ways of thinking, but also of
creating new schemes of politicizing in the fight for a ‘‘new
anti-disciplinary right’’ (Moita Lopes 2006, p. 27; Pennycook
2006, p. 75; Foucault 2000, p. 190).
In our work with the teachers, we neither tried to
establish a relationship of opposition between transgression
and normativeness, and nor do we see in that a problem of
a logical, epistemological, or political nature. That is
because, for us, normativeness is a constitutive instance of
any practice and, less than a threat, its recognition is a
condition for the achievement of transgressive practices, as
well as for the exercise of our freedom. And even when, for
certain purposes, the normative is seen as oppressor and in
need of being transgressed, such transgression does not
lead us to a state of non-normativeness, but simply estab-
lishes, or tries to, other ways of normativeness.
The way we have practiced the indiscipline as trans-
gression is also inspired in the Wittgensteinian notion of
philosophical therapy and in the Derridian notion of
deconstruction (Derrida 2004). In the first case, the
approach is characterized by the style of Wittgenstein’s
philosophy that does not seek to ‘‘solve problems’’, but to
juxtapose words with the intent of highlighting absurdities
arising from favoring one meaning to the detriment of
others. In the second case, the approach is characterized by
the style of Derrida’s philosophy of deconstructing all
kinds of language games centered in the binary opposition
between the sensitive and the intelligible that always refer
ultimately to a referential or transcendental meaning.
The use we are making of the term indisciplinary here
does not mean to suggest that it should be understood as a
synonym for non-disciplinary, neither when the word dis-
cipline is seen as a limited school field of knowledge or as
a limited field of scientific-academic investigation, nor
when seen as a group of guiding norms of thought and
behavior. In that sense, when we speak in indisciplinary (or
transgressive) problematization of practices, we are refer-
ring to a methodological practice oriented toward a polit-
ical ethic which is simultaneously open, non-dogmatic,
destabilized, and deconstructive.
Such practice voluntarily transgresses the boundaries of
cultural disciplines, established in order to be recognized as
equally legitimate, from the point of view of the teaching
action, activities and practices which, for whatever reason,
did not reach the disciplinary statute.
The pedagogic legitimacy of this methodological
transgression rests not only upon the point of view
according to which all human activities are producers of
culture, but also on the point of view that a practice, in the
passage from one field of activity to another, unavoidably
disconnects itself from its original normative conditions
and becomes formatted according to the normative condi-
tions of the new field of activity into which it has been
mobilized in an equally idiosyncratic way. Thus, we could
no longer say that, strictly speaking, we would be facing
the same practice.
The concept of education that orients this methodolog-
ical procedure is the collective capacity of a community to
problematize practices interactively and indisciplinarily. In
the problematization process, there is no identifiable dif-
ference between roles of participants. That is because it is
up to all of them to ask and answer questions collectively;
however, aware that such responses are always open to
discussion because they are based on an ethics policy
equally open to discussion.
2.3 The four steps of mobilizing histories
In a first phase, participants are constituted as a commu-
nity of memory.5 In this phase, they involve themselves in
5 The concept of communities of memory was suggested by Peter
Burke (2000), who coined it inspired by the concept of interpretative
communities that had previously been created by the literary critic
Stanley Fish to analyze conflicts generated by possible alternative
interpretations of literary texts. According to Fish, the operations and
mental strategies we conduct in an interpretative act would be
conditioned by the institutions within which we are already inserted,
being in its turn, anchored in a public system of intelligibility, because
‘‘we do not have free and autonomous readers in a relation of
perceptive adequacy or inadequacy towards a text which is equally
autonomous. On the contrary, we have readers whose consciousness
is built by a series of conventional notions that, when set into
function, will constitute a conventional object seen conventionally’’
(Fish 1993, p. 162). In its turn, the concept of communities of memory
is thus characterized in Burke’s words: ‘‘Facing the multiplicity of
social identities and the co-existence of opposing and alternative
memories (…) it is useful to think in pluralistic terms about the uses
of memory by different social groups, which may have different
visions of what is important or memorable. (…) It is important to ask:
who wants who to remember what and why? Whose registered or
preserved version is it?’’ (Burke 2000, p. 84).
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an individual activity of reminiscence about their
schooling processes, aiming to investigate, above all,
mobilizing school practices of mathematics culture with
which they would have been involved in their school
context. Since, after this first phase, the community-class
should split into four groups that shall conduct investi-
gations focusing on mobilizing school practices of
specific cultural objects of Brazilian mathematical edu-
cation—such as trigonometry, logarithms, geometry,
functions, etc.—we request the participants that their
reminiscences, above all, reflect such practices. This
request is the only direction given during this individual
practice of reminiscence.
This investigative work of individual reminiscence is
preceded by a session of collective problematization whose
objective is to identify the different social uses of
remembering and forgetting practices when mobilized in
different contexts, such as in historic investigation, in
criminal investigation, in psychoanalysis, in neuroscience,
in the evaluation and reconstitution of historical–cultural
heritage, in literature, in the rescue of cultural identity, etc.
During this session, we make it explicit to the participants
that the use we would make of their reminiscences in our
classes would have as a purpose the creation of an inter-
pretative diagram of school practices of mathematics cul-
ture mobilization, reflecting the collective memory of the
community-class.
After this first problematization section, the participants
produce a set of texts that, when placed within the broader
context of the collective investigation process, [the set] is
seen as a collection of discursive games of alternative
individual memories of the community-class members,
about mobilizing school practices of mathematics culture
in a determined time and place.
After oral presentation of some of these discursive
memory games to the community-class, all the games are
subject to more systematical analytic treatments made by
four of the participants who are not allowed to communi-
cate with one another during the process. This way, based
on an analytical reading of all individual memory texts,
these four participants create another four discursive games
of alternative social memories of the community-class.
Such texts are said to be analytical because they must
display a categorization, characterized description and
interpretation of the mobilizing school practices of math-
ematical culture which manifest itself in the group of
memories of every community-class. For the production of
these texts, guidance is given so that they identify, in the
individual memories of the participants, very frequent or
common practices, as well as less frequent or idiosyncratic
practices, since the intended goal is to give visibility to all
of them. In that sense, the texts must not eliminate con-
trasts, disagreements or contradictions which, eventually,
may manifest themselves in the individual memories, given
that the intended goal is not to produce rationalized
histories.
Other directions are given so that the descriptive cate-
gories of the individual memories also consider: objects of
the mathematics culture mobilized by the teaching prac-
tices; teaching methods; instruments or didactic material
mobilized by these practices; norms and methods of
behavior control and of coexistence (repression instru-
ments, punishment and ways of exercising power) mobi-
lized by these practices; norms that dictate the work of
teachers and students in class; evaluation practices of
mathematics learning; etc.
The purpose of such analysis is to construct an initial
interpretative picture of these school practices from the
perspective of the community of memory itself which is
conducting the investigation of such practices. From this
moment on, the community-class itself creates and dis-
tributes the first written documents referring to the history
of Brazilian mathematics education to all its members. Of
course, these text documents are flashes of histories as
lived by the members of that particular community-class.
This version of history, solely based on the memory of the
community-class as a research source, is neither seen by us
as illegitimate nor as false or incomplete, but as a version
of the history told from the perspective of those commu-
nity-class members, based on their experiences and inter-
pretative resources.
In a second phase, participants split into four thematic
groups in order to pose guiding questions that shall provide
continuity to the investigation on mobilizing school prac-
tices of mathematics culture. Now, however, such ques-
tions shall focus on specific school practices related to
mathematical objects that constitute the investigation
theme of each group. Such questions can be of any nature:
pedagogic, historic, philosophic, epistemological, logic,
sociologic, etc.
Next, the questions raised by those groups go through a
session of collective problematization, during which they
are debated with the purpose of being expanded, modified
or excluded, aiming now at the expectations and interests
of the community-class as a whole. Throughout this ses-
sion, we play a very important role in trying to broaden the
motivation and expectation horizons in relation to the
investigations that shall be conducted. We do so by pre-
senting surprises, provoking different thoughts, posing new
challenges, exposing conflicts, raising new conjectures,
new questions, etc.
After this problematization section, groups start
arranging a new set of questions, now analyzed by the
community-class. So that such questions can be investi-
gated, we make available to the group not only specific
bibliographical references related to each of the themes,
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but also a set of Basic Problematization Units (BPU).
Below, we present an example of BPU.
In the sixth century B.C., Eupalinos of Megara
invented a method to build a subterraneous aqueduct,
in Samos, ordered by the tyrant Policrates. In order to
build it, slaves coming from the Greek island of
Lesbos had to dig through the Kastro Mount. The
tunnel – which took about 20 years to be build – still
exists and is about 1036 m long and 2 m wide. It was
simultaneously dug from both ends, B and D, of the
aqueduct, i.e., from two points on the mountain, at
different altitudes. The mistake in the meeting of both
excavations was almost 10 m apart, horizontally, and
2.5 m vertically. Actually, this is a small mistake,
less than 1%. Based on the book ‘‘On the Dioptra’’,
written much later by Heron of Alexandria, we infer
that, supposedly, Eupalinos would have proceeded
the following way: he chose a B point, next to the
first entrance of the tunnel; then he chose an E point,
on the plain part of the terrain around the mount,
from where the point B could be seen; using an
instrument similar to the dioptra, he obtained the
direction EF, perpendicular to the direction EB;
through a set of other perpendicular and consecutive
directions – FG, GH, HK and KL -, he established, in
the direction KL, the point M of the terrain, obtained
by the perpendicular DM to the segment KL, where D
is the other opposite entrance point of the tunnel; he
measured, directly on the terrain floor that surrounded
the mountain, the distances BE, EF, FG, GH, HK,
KM and MD; based on these measurements, he
established the measures of the imaginary perpen-
dicular lines DN and BN, passing through the inside
of the mountain and based on them, he then deter-
mined the alpha direction to be followed by both
digger teams.
As the example shows, a BPU is nothing more than a
discursive memory flash which describes a situated prac-
tice6 in a determined field of human activity, and it would
actually have been used to answer the necessary piece of a
community of practice at some point in the development of
that activity in history.
After an oral or written presentation of this discursive
flash to the participants, some questions posed by the
community-class give rise to an open indisciplinary pro-
blematization process of BPU.
Next, we pose some questions that we have raised—
among others posed by the participants—in different pro-
blematization sessions of the above-mentioned BPU:
• The method supposedly used by Eupalinos, showed
itself adequate to the construction of the aqueduct?
Why?
• Describe, characterize and discuss the technological
artifacts and knowledge (whether mathematical or not)
that could have been mobilized by Eupalinos to build
the Samos aqueduct.
• How do you characterize the topographic activities and
practices in ancient Greece around the sixth century
B.C.?
• Today, since we have techniques and technological
tools available—such as theodolite, laser rays, GPS,
etc.—as well as a constituted trigonometry, we know
that the same problem can be solved in different ways.
Propose new methods to solve it.
• Does it make sense proposing a generic solution to
Eupalinos’ problem? Why? Are generic methods
always better than local methods?
• How would you characterize current topographic
activities and practices?
• Suppose that you know only the point B to start digging
the aqueduct in one of the sides of the mountain and
that it would not be necessary to establish the point D
a priori. Solve the problem considering these new
conditions.
• Search and explore, analytically, images available in
printed books or other kinds of available media which
illustrate instruments and methods produced by our
ancestors to carry out direct or indirect measuring of
distances and angles.
• Describe some of the ancient and modern instruments
for measuring distances and angles in physical space.
Explain how they are used and the mathematical basis
by which they are used.
• Formulate and solve problems involving measurements
of non-accessible distances and angles.
• Formulate and solve, using the topographic triangula-
tion method, a surveying problem that involves an
estimate of the area of a plot of land.
• There is not a consensus among historians if the dioptra
was really available at the time when Eupalinos built
his aqueduct. Heron of Alexandria dedicated a whole
book—named ‘‘On the Dioptra’’—about the construc-
tion and usage of the dioptra in surveying activities.
In the website http://www.mlhanas.de/Greeks/Heron
Alexandria.htm, you can get an example by Heron on
6 Practices are said to be situated (Lave 1988) in the sense of always
being conducted under multiple normative conditioning relative to the
institutional context of human activity itself in which they are carried
out, as well as the institutional contexts of other fields of human
activity. For being conceived here as human institutions, time and
space also constitute normative contexts that condition all human
activities, but not in one way only, nor determinant or homogeneous,
once the time is always the time of the activity itself.
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how to use the Dioptra to build a tunnel through two
opposite points in a mountain. Consulting this and other
sources, describe the dioptra and supply information
about how it could have been used as a topographic or
surveying instrument. Also explain how it could have
been used by Eupalinos to establish perpendicular
directions to other known ones. Establish comparisons
between a dioptra and a theodolite.
• Who was Policrates and why did he want to build an
aqueduct? Who was Eupalinos and why he had been
called to build the aqueduct?
• In book 3, Herodotus refers to Eupalinos’ aqueduct: ‘‘I
have talked so much about the Samians, because, of all
the Greeks, they have made the three greatest works of
construction. One is a double-mouthed channel driven
underground through a hill nine hundred feet high… The
second is a mole in the sea around the harbor, one
hundred and twenty feet deep. The length of the mole is a
quarter of a mile. The third work of the Samians is the
greatest temple that I have ever seen’’. This passage
suggests that social practices related to civil construction
and architecture activities were already well developed
among ancient Greeks. Create a story in which the image
of Eupalinos appears as a member of a community of
practice linked to construction and architecture, around
the sixth century B.C. In this story, try to characterize
this community of practice concerning: cultural objects
that it could have mobilized; the way the labor division
was done among its members; the underlying rules
guiding interpersonal relations which assured the main-
tenance of this kind of labor division; the power relations
in the core of this community.
• In 1921, at the request of Architectures magazine, the
book Eupalinos or the Architect was published. It
contributed to the acclaim of the French writer and poet
Paul Vale´ry. Do a brief but detailed report on this book
and bring it along to discuss it in class.
• If you were using a BPU similar to this one along with
High School students, with what goals would you do it,
and how would you conduct your class to achieve such
goals? Is this BPU accessible to High School students?
Why?
• In what ways do you think this BPU could contribute to
making school practices to mobilize, in an organic way,
mathematical, scientific, technological, educational,
artistic-literary and historical cultures? Why?
It is important to establish similarities and differences
between a BPU and an indisciplinary problematization
procedure. Strictly speaking, a BPU is not a methodolog-
ical tool, but a discursive memory flash that describes a
practice (in the example considered here, the practice of
building aqueducts) in a field of human activity (in the
example considered here, the activity of constructing
public buildings) that, for some reason, is elected as a in-
disciplinary problematization object. Such practice may, at
some moment of its problematization, disconnect itself
from the human activity field in which it was being initially
problematized to connect to another activity field (as for
instance: the literary activity field, the activity field of
educators’ formation, the school teaching activity field,
etc.). On the other hand, the very procedure of indisci-
plinary problematization can also be seen as a methodo-
logical practice that may be applied in the activity field of
teacher education or in the field of school teaching activity.
Thus, conceived, an indisciplinary problematization also
starts to be seen as a practice which is based on a discursive
memory flash of another practice taken as a basic unit of a
methodological problematization.
Often, the set of BPU we propose to the community-
class cannot be found in textbooks or in official proposals
related to mathematical school education. The set of BPU
is produced in order to problematize mobilizing school
practices of mathematics culture, contrasting them with
ways that mathematics culture could have been (or has
been) mobilized in other human activities. This does not
mean, though, that these BPUs cannot be changed and used
for other purposes, especially, with the High School or
Elementary School. As a result, many of the BPU do not
demand in-depth mathematical knowledge to be initially
discussed in class, although the problematization of a BPU,
due to its always open indisciplinary nature, can achieve
unpredictable levels of depth, sophistication, complexity,
subtlety and originality.
Seen from another perspective, a BPU could also be
considered a discursive game mediator of teacher educa-
tion. In BPU production, we make an effort to value ele-
ments that are usually considered superfluous or irrelevant
by mobilizing school practices of mathematics culture:
contexts, historicity, informality and simplicity. The rank-
ing of BPU is normally done according to two basic cri-
teria: the nature of the activity fields that have probably
motivated the creation, and the qualitative transformations
of the mathematical objects that are being investigated,
along with the chronological criteria that order these
qualitative transformations. The chronological period
involved is that of Pre-History up to the twenty-first cen-
tury, and the involved practices are, e.g., the ones which
have participated on the mobilization of mathematical
objects in focus throughout history.
When we propose that participants explore BPU, we
normally warn them not to see BPUs as if they were a
conventional list of school or academic exercises, but as an
invitation to problematization.
In our work, we have mainly explored practices con-
nected to human activities, such as nautical, agricultural,
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economical–financial, commercial, topographical, astro-
logical–astronomical, mystical–religious, political, artistic,
military, playful, educational, and scientific investigation.
In the second phase of our work, the purpose of the
problematization is to create a set of oral and written dis-
cursive games based on the exploration of pertinent his-
torical literature that supports the discussion of BPUs.
These discursive games shall compose a second interpre-
tative picture of mobilizing practices of mathematics cul-
ture, now with basis on the memories of different
communities that could have performed such practices in
the context of different human activities.
In a third phase, which is simultaneously developed with
the second one, participants are involved in assessing
official programs and textbooks written for teaching
mathematics in Brazilian schools, from the nineteenth
century through today. In this phase, the four groups of
participants question these new document research sources
based on the guiding questions which had been raised in
the second phase. The dialogue established with these new
sources is supported by the reading of a set of academic
research texts about selected moments in the history of
Brazilian school mathematics education. The results of
these investigations constitute new discursive games
of alternative memories of mobilizing social practices of
mathematics culture. These games shall compose two new
interpretative pictures of these practices by the participants.
One offers the community perspective of official text
producers written to reformulate and regulate mathematics
education in Brazil at different times. The other game is in
the community perspective of authors whose textbooks are
destined for use in teaching school mathematics. These
games are collectively presented and problematized by the
community-class.
Finally, in a fourth and last phase, the four groups of
participants carry out interviews with both mathematics
teachers and Elementary and High School students. These
interviews are formatted as printed texts and interpreted,
having as background the reading of academic research
works on the history of teachers’ lives, from autobiog-
raphies and narratives. A new set of discursive memory
games is produced, presented and collectively problema-
tized by the community-class. These games shall compose
a last interpretative picture of mobilizing school practices
of mathematics culture, now in the perspective of the
mathematics teaching community itself.
3 Mobilizing histories, what for? A dialogue
with Engestro¨m’s theoretical perspective
In this section, we have as a goal to problematize how we
mobilize histories in mathematics teacher education,
through a game of approximation and drawing back from
the theoretical perspective of the expansive learning, such
as it is presented by Engestro¨m (1991), in his provocative
article Non scolae sed vitae discimus—towards overcoming
the encapsulation of school learning.
Even if Engestro¨m’s point of view—as well as the
context in which his discussion is carried out—refers
exclusively to the school teaching activity, we think there
should exist, if not a convergence, at least an appropriate
ethical–political consonance between the concept of edu-
cation we defend when involved in the school teaching
activity itself and that which we look forward to put into
practice when—engaged in the activity of teachers edu-
cation—we refer to the school teaching activity. Besides,
although we believe a difference exists between the nature
of the resource material and discursive resources available,
as well as between the nature of the methodological pro-
cedures followed and the degree with which we mobilize
them in one situation or another, we do not make a ethical–
political distinction between the mobilization of histories
within these two contexts of educational activity.
The provocative Latin aphorism present in the first part
of the title of the Engestro¨m’s article—We do not learn for
school, but for life—as well as his confident answer sug-
gested in the subtitle, pointing to the possibility of over-
coming the school’s encapsulation, it urges us to question
the contribution that our particular way to mobilize histo-
ries could bring to this discussion, comparatively to the
role attributed to history by Engestro¨m, in his expansive
learning model.
According to this author,
since school is a historically formed practice, perhaps
the initial step toward breaking its encapsulation is
that students are invited to look at its contents and
procedures critically, in the light of their history.
Why not let the students themselves find out how
their misconceptions are manufactured in school?
(Engestro¨m 1991, p. 254).
For him, among the original focuses of these miscon-
ceptions are the textbooks widely used as teaching tools
that mediate school teaching and learning. In this sense, he
questions himself:
if it is true that textbooks create closed and often
illusory compartments in the minds of the students,
should it not be desirous that students learn to treat
textbooks as historical artifacts, as attempts to fix and
crystallize certain generally accepted conceptions of
the epoch? This would imply that (…) the students
were led to (…) analyze and use the textbooks as
limited sources often in need of thorough criticism
(Engestro¨m, 1991, p. 254).
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We think that our particular way of mobilizing histories
agrees with Engestro¨m’s purpose, not exactly ‘‘surpass-
ing’’, but rather challenging school encapsulation based on
history. It also supports his point of view about the need to
make textbooks an object of systematic critical evaluation,
due to their great power not exactly to create ‘‘miscon-
ceptions’’, but to naturalize several kinds of beliefs.
Particularly regarding the role of history in ‘‘overcom-
ing’’ school encapsulation, Engestro¨m’s model of expan-
sive learning adopts fundamental ideas developed by
Davydov, as well as by Lave and Wenger.
According to Engestro¨m, ‘‘Davydov’s solution to the
encapsulation of school learning is to spread school
knowledge out into the world by making it dynamic and
theoretically powerful when facing practical problems.’’
(Engestro¨m 1991, p. 251). Moreover, the solution he infers
from Lave nd Wenger’s works to this same problem is
‘‘pushing communities of practice from the outside world
into the school’’ (Engestro¨m 1991, p. 253).
In Davydov’s proposal putting the students into dialogue
with the discoverers from the past, Engestro¨m sees a great
deal of advancement once such dialogue ends up, not only
identifying the object of learning with the practical and
historical context of the discovery, but also attributing a
relative power to students, without pretending to eliminate
the teacher’s power (Engestro¨m 1991, p. 188). Neverthe-
less, Engestro¨m criticizes Davydov’s strategy, considering
it ‘‘narrowly cognitive and scientistic’’ and not contributing
to the modification of the social basis of school learning
(Engestro¨m 1991, p. 251).
He also sees a considerable advance from Lave and
Wenger’s proposal in relation to Davydov’s, regarding the
rupture of school learning encapsulation, once Lave and
Wenger put the practical application context as the central
object of school activity, and not the discovery context, as
Davydov suggests. However, for him, Lave and Wenger’s
proposal fails because it does not systematically seek the
genetic origin of the key ideas of school subjects so that
they can be reproduced in the school learning process
(1991, p. 190).
Even pointing out the limitations he finds in both of
these proposals, Engestro¨m believes that it is possible—
and pedagogically convenient—to conceive school educa-
tional activity as a combination of the historical context of
the discovery, such as proposed by Davydov, and the
strategy of reproduction, in classes, of the context of
application of school knowledge in non-educational social
practices, such as proposed by Lave and Wenger.
However, as he thinks this combination would not be
enough to overcome encapsulation of school learning, he
proposes adding a third component to the object of the
educational activity: the critical context. And he justifies
such inclusion and combination based on the argument that
each one of the three complementary modes of
knowing and learning suggested has distinct cogni-
tive, motivational and social strengths. The context of
the criticism highlights the powers of resisting,
questioning, contradicting, and debating. The context
of discovery highlights the powers of experimenting,
modeling, symbolizing, and generalizing. The con-
text of application highlights the powers of social
relevance and embeddedness of knowledge, the
community involvement and guided practice (…). In
summary, expansive learning proposes to break the
encapsulation of school learning, by expanding the
object of learning (…). (Engestro¨m 1991, p. 255;
p. 256).
We think, however, that this strategy of additive
expansion of the object of school learning activity cannot
clearly identify the nature of this object, i.e., the nature of
the analysis unit which school educational activity should
take as the object of problematization. It seems clear that,
for Engestro¨m, this analysis unit would not be each one of
the contexts (criticism, discovery or practical application)
focused and/or isolated in succession. It would neither be a
natural nor an isolated social phenomenon nor specific
school subject content. Such an analysis unit seems to
identify itself with any school content simultaneously
focused on critical, discovery and practical application
contexts. However, the starting point is still school content
or isolated knowledge whose analysis would be gradually
expanded until it reached meta-reflexive behaviors con-
cerning the previous analytic phases themselves. It is
especially this expansionist strategy of the object of edu-
cational activity that distinguishes Engestro¨m’s proposal
from ours.
In our proposal, the objects set for problematization are
discursive memory flashes produced by different commu-
nities of practice.
According to Engestro¨m (1991, p. 256), in his expansive
learning model, ‘‘school learning reflectively reorganizes
itself as an activity system, and this kind of collective and
reflective self-organization is becoming a necessity in
practically all kinds of social practice’’. However, we think
that problematizing histories of practices situated in dif-
ferent human activities are something that qualitatively and
politically go beyond a ‘‘reflective and collective self-
organization’’—and even meta-reflexive—from the proper
school learning activity itself.
It is also not about trying ‘‘to push school knowledge out
into the world’’ neither ‘‘to push communities of practice
from the outside world into the school’’. And if there is no
doubt that we should align with the Latin aphorism that
‘‘we do not learn for school, but for life’’, Engestro¨m’s
expansive learning proposal seems to have realized, only
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partially, that reproducing or simulating life in school is
something politically much more different than proble-
matizing7 life in school.
We know today that no matter how some school prac-
tices try to move toward situated practices performed by
other communities of practice, they always end up being
formatted as typical school practices. Students usually see
this and treat them this way as well. This happens because
even trying to adapt them to the contemporary media style
of ‘‘reality shows’’, school practices will never be able to
be effectively lived by students as non-educational prac-
tices in the same way that they are experienced by those
who carry them out in other human activities.
This impossibility of effectively living school practices
is because in going from one activity to another practice
unavoidably get disconnected from their original normative
conditioning and start being shaped according to the nor-
mative conditioning of the new activity in which they are
always performed in an idiosyncratic way. Thus, we could
no longer say that, strictly speaking, we would be facing
the same practice. In this way, powers, values and affec-
tions mobilized by those practices in a certain activity field
can also be considerably modified.
Walkerdine called our attention to these facts when she
comparatively analyzed the shopping game performed in
class, involving 7-year-old children, with selected shopping
practices effectively performed in non-educational activi-
ties. It states that the group of children in a school situation,
has found, in the disconnection between the prices
presented in the activity and the real prices, reason
for fun and fantasy. Every time children, in a school
situation, wanted to go shopping, they always had a
new ten-cent coin, that is, their money never dimin-
ished, as it would happen if they shopped in real life.
Besides, the object of their purchases was not a set of
goods, but some calculations written on the paper. In
other words, in the store simulated in the classroom,
no actual exchanges would happen, but only simu-
lated exchanges (Walkerdine 2004, p. 118).
But how should we interpret those calculi written on
paper in the simulated school situation? At first sight,
affirms Walkerdine (2004, p. 118), ‘‘we could think that the
calculi would have been, actually, abstracted from every-
day practices’’. However, she continues, ‘‘the usage of the
term ‘‘abstracted’’ can be deceiving, because new calculi
exist as a discursive relation in a new set of practices, such
as those from school math, with their ways of regulation
and submission’’ (Walkerdine 2004, p. 118).
For her, what could have happened was not a passage
from the concrete to the abstract, or from the abstract to the
concrete, but ‘‘a passing from one discursive practice to
another’’. And yet, according to her, ‘‘what would have
started to be valued, in the school situation, as a higher
order activity would be the effort to regulate and control,
through reason, the social order which has the bourgeois
subject as a norm, the one who does not need to calculate to
survive’’ (Walkerdine 2004, p. 118).
Besides, according to her, in the school situation each
child positions himself as a subject in a different way from
which it would happen in non-school practices. This way
could be similar to or different from subjection patterns in
which such children are involved in other practices, but
according to Walkerdine (2004, p. 118), ‘‘evidence sug-
gests that, to oppressed groups, patterns are substantially
different, a fact which could bring unfolding, important
affective and political developments’’.
This simple example strongly suggests to us that we
definitely need to break from the general assumption
shared by structuralist–formalist psychological perspec-
tives. This presupposition states that—in order to be sup-
posedly more theoretical, more generic, more abstract,
more structuring and more structured—school practices
would have the power to transfer and apply themselves, in
a responsible way, to non-educational fields of human
activities. Therefore, Walkerdine’s example suggests that
we question the belief in the conservation of a supposed
original purity and essentiality of the practices in their
different circulation process and devote special attention to
the idiosyncratic purposes and effects of these processes in
each field of human activity.
Walkerdine’s example calls into question curricular
practices that insist upon structuring themselves in such
generic, abstract and vague categories, like ‘‘school con-
tents’’, ‘‘historical knowledge gathered by the mankind’’,
etc. It also leads us to arrive at the conclusion that school is
not similar to life, nor life to school; a ten or a zero in life
are not like a 10 or a zero at school; that success or failure
in life is not like success or failure at school; that what is
explicit in life is not like what is explicit in the school’s
didactic contract; and that the concealed in life is not like
the concealed curriculum of school.
We think that this happens because school is not and could
not be found in life itself, but at the edge of it, just like the
Wittgensteinian subject is not in the world, but at the world’s
edge. It is at this edge of life that we think the object of the
educational activity can be found, and consequently, the
object of the teacher education activity. And when placing
this object at the edge of life, on the boundary that connects
and, at the same time, separates an internal and an external
life as it is, we mean that this object cannot be a reflection of
life as it is, but as we wish it were.
7 Practices of problematization always mobilize values associated
with political ethics. And there is no educational activity in the
absence of these types of values.
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4 Final considerations
Somehow, all human activities find itself encapsulated in
itself, even if relationships with other human activities are
established. The same happens with school educational
activity. From our perspective, the object of mathematics
teacher education—and, consequently, that of the school
educational activity—consists of discursive memory flash
games produced by different communities of practice, upon
which the problematization practice falls. In this way, the
practice of problematization becomes constituent of the
ethnicity8 of the school ethno-community. This ethnicity,
i.e., the cultural bond that links and identifies the members
of this community, is the commitment with the promotion
of practices of problematizing histories of different prac-
tices and is not exclusively considered ‘‘scientific.’’
Thus, if on the one hand, the so-called scientific prac-
tices constitute themselves based on the suspicion of
practices performed by other ethno-communities—decon-
structing them as scientific and, consequently, constructing
them as lower practices (Lave 1996)—these, on the other
hand, have also resisted and persisted in their suspicion or
indifference in relation to the so-called scientific practices.
However, from our perspective, the scientific ethno-com-
munity itself should be seen as one among other ethno-
communities, even if they do not see themselves this way.
This means that, for the ethno-community educational
school, the cultural scientific practices should not enjoy any
previous epistemological privileges or political absolutes in
relation to practices accomplished by other ethno-
communities.
Thus, the nature of the commitment shared by the school
teaching community has imposed the activity that its
members develop, not exactly a scientific character, but a
deconstructive ethical–political nature. This means that,
based on a non-ethnocentric political ethic—but one that
fights all forms of submission, discrimination and exploi-
tation of man by man, school education should have as a
purpose the preparation of people for the transgressive
problematization of practices and discursive games con-
stituting all forms of public life, i.e., of all the ways people
have to organize themselves publicly in ethno-
communities.
In this political school teaching projects, conceived as a
group of politicization practices, in which the school cur-
riculum is to be organized—in a dynamic and investigative
way—based on BPUs, both mathematics and histories are
to be conceived not as fixed and distinguishable blocks of
contents, but as distinct ways of seeing and investigating
practices. In this context, mathematics should be conceived
as practices of investigation of the normative aspects of
different practices; similarly, histories are understood as
practices of investigation of plural memories of different
practices.
And because we think that there must be a teleological
consonance between an ethical–political project for school
teaching and an ethical–political project for teacher edu-
cation, we also think that such consonance should be
related to our ways of conceiving the role of the mobili-
zation of histories in these two fields of teaching activity.
For this indisciplinary ethical–political project, it does not
make sense to assign different roles to be played by his-
tories, mathematics and other school subjects. Ultimately,
all of them would fit the role of production of new forms of
politicization, i.e., new ways of interfering in social rela-
tionships and in current ways of organizing different fields
of human activity.
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